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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH RIDDLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

i

Case No. 880204

i

Category 14(b)

ALAN MAYS and MOUNTAIN STATES
INSULATION CORP., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Defendants/respondents Alan Mays ("Mays") and
Mountain States Insulation Corporation ("MSI"), by and
through their counsel of record, submit the following brief.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and §78-2-2
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court.

This is an appeal taken from a final

order of Judge J. Phillip Eves after a hearing on respondents1
Motion for Summary Judgment in the Fifth Judicial District
Court.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court was
correct in ruling that since Mays and MSI were "employees" of
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation ("Owens-Corning") for
purposes of the Workers1 Compensation Act, Mays and MSI were
entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision of
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 and not subject to suit by appellant.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Court's interpretation of the following statutes
is determinative of the issue on review and these statutes are
set out verbatim in Addendum "A" of the addenda to this Brief.
1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1953 as amended).

2.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1953 as amended).

3.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1953 as amended)

STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence action by an Owens-Corning
employee against MSI, a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, and
an employee of MSI, for injuries received in an on-the-job
accident.

Mays and MSI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

based on the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-60.

Riddle filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, and
appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.
-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Riddle was an employee of Owens-Corning,

hired to construct a storage warehouse and assist in the
installation of insulation. (Clerk1s Record Index ["R."] 376
pp. 15-16, attached as Addendum "B").
2.

Mays was an employee of Owens-Corning, hired

to assist in construction of a storage warehouse and in the
installation of insulation.

(Clerk's Record Index ["R."] 376

p. 17, attached as Addendum "B", and R. 310).
3.

Owens-Corning was a contractor at the

Intermountain Power Project ("IPP") in Delta, Utah, hired
to construct a storage warehouse and install insulation. (R.
376 pp. 15-16, attached as Addendum "B", and R. 310).
4.

Owens-Corning subcontracted with MSI to

provide labor to erect the storage warehouse. (R. 376 p. 18,
attached as Addendum "B", and R. 310).
5.

After Mays had been with Owens-Corning for

three weeks, he and all Owens-Corning employees, except Riddle
and one other man, were terminated.

(R. 376 p. 18, attached as

Addendum "B").
6.

MSI then hired Mays as a laborer to help

construct the storage warehouse and Mays continued doing the
same work for MSI that he had done for Owens-Corning. (R.
376 pp. 17-19, attached as Addendum "B").
7.

Riddle continued to be employed by
-3-

Owens-Corning and supervised the work done by MSI and its
employees in erecting the storage warehouse.

(R. 376 pp.

19-22, attached as Addendum "B").
8.

Riddle was sitting in a parked truck when he

was hit by a truck driven by Mays. (R. 323).
9.

It is undisputed that both men were working

when the accident occurred. (R. 323).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the law in the State of Utah that a
co-employee cannot maintain a civil action against another
co-employee.

Riddle and Mays began their employment with

Owens-Corning and were in every respect co-employees.

Mays

then began performing the same duty with MSI and continuing
to be supervised by Riddle.

This change by Mays did not

eliminate the co-employee relationship.
Allowing Riddle to maintain a negligence action
against Mays, while at the same time not allowing Mays to
maintain such a civil action against Riddle if Riddle were
negligent, defies the whole concept of fairness and should not
be allowed.

The Supreme Court has determined that if Mays had

been injured by Riddle, Mays could not maintain a civil action
against Riddle.

This Court's decision was made after an

amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act narrowed the benefit
of this exclusive remedy to those occupying an
-4-

employer-employee relationship.

Because the statutory

employer-employee language of the Workers1 Compensation Act
still applies, the policy behind the Workers1 Compensation Act
dictates that Riddle and Mays should be immune from civil suit
against one another.
Finally, Riddle maintains that a genuine issue of
fact exists regarding Owens-Coming's control over MSI.
This control issue was answered to the trial court's
satisfaction by appellant's own explanation of the facts.
Appellant cannot refute his own testimony and Owens-Corning's
control over MSI is no longer an issue in this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-60 PROVIDES THE ONLY
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.
When Mays first began working at IPP he was
employed by Owens-Corning and was a co-employee with Riddle.
After Owens-Corning subcontracted with MSI for the work being
done by Riddle and Mays, Mays began receiving his paycheck from
MSI while continuing to do the same work he did when he
received a paycheck from Owens-Corning.

Riddle continued in

his employment with Owens-Corning and supervised the work of
MSI and Mays.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined in Bambrough
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v, Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Utah 1976) that "a worker
can be hired and paid by a subcontractor, but still be an
employee of the general contractor."

Following the Court's

rationale in Bethers, Mays began work at IPP as an actual
employee of Owens-Corning and because his duties did not change
when MSI became the subcontractor for Owens-Corning, Mays is
still an employee of Owens-Corning.

The Court in Bethers

went on to say that if an employee has the same employer as
another employee, "he is entitled to and must accept workmen's
compensation and cannot maintain an action against either of
them [the employer or another employee of the same employer]
for negligence in causing his injuries."

Id. at 1289.

See

also, Gallegos v. Stringham, 442 P.2d 331 (Utah 1968)
(plaintiff and defendant held to be working for the same
employer and therefore plaintiff cannot recover outside
workers' compensation).
Respondents' position is supported by the following
language in Utah Code Ann., §35-1-60 (1953 as amended)
("Section 60"):
The right to recover compensation pursuant
to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether
resulting in death or not, shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer and
shall be the exclusive remedy against any
officer, agent or employee of the
employer and the liabilities of the
employer posed by this Act shall be in
place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever at common law or otherwise. . . .
-6-

(Emphasis added).

Section 60 does not say that this exclusive

remedy of the Workers1 Compensation Act is available only
against the actual employer or actual employee of the
employer.

That section merely states that this exclusive

remedy is available against the employer or employee of the
employer.

Because Riddle and Mays are co-employees of

Owens-Corning, Section 60 gives Mays immunity from civil suit.
Also, because no civil suit can be maintained against Mays,
Riddle has no theory for bringing a civil claim against MSI.
Therefore, the denial of appellant's claims against respondents
by the trial court was proper and should be upheld by this
Court.

POINT II
THE POLICY OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT SHOULD NOT
ALLOW AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO SUE THE
SUBCONTRACTOR OR AN EMPLOYEE OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR.
The primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act
("Act") was to:
eliminate the uncertainty, the time, effort
and expense involved in the old system
which required an injured employee to prove
negligence of his employer as a
prerequisite to any recovery, and to create
a system whereby the injured employee would
be assured of medical and hospital care,
and a certain though modest compensation
for injuries and disabilities suffered,
with the attendant benefits to themselves,
their families, and to society generally,
including the stabilizing effect upon the
economy.
-7-

Smith v, Alfred Brown Company, 493 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah
1972).

Thus, the Act was designed to insure that an injured

employee would be compensated for any work-related injury.
"Employee" is defined as follows in Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-42 (1953 as amended) ("Section 42") as not only an
employee of the same employer in the ordinary sense, but also
more broadly to include subcontractors and employees of
subcontractors:
If any person who is an employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for
him by a contractor over whose work he
retains supervision and control, and this
work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor,
all persons employed by him, all
subcontractors under him and all persons
employed by any of these subcontractors,
are considered employees of the original
employer.
This broadening of the definition of "employee" effectuates the
policy behind the Act of providing insurance for an employee's
work-related injuries.

Thus, if an employer hires a

subcontractor over whose work he "retains supervision and
control," and the work "is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer," the subcontractor and all employees
of the subcontractor are considered employees of the original
employer, or "statutory employees" for purposes of the Workers'
Compensation Act.

Bennett v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,

726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986).
Appellant argues that the 1975 amendments to Utah
-8-

Code Ann, §35-1-62 (Section 62) make the provisions of Section
42 not applicable to determining which employers are immune
from third-party suits. However, appellant concedes that if
Mays had been injured by the negligence of appellant, Mays
would not be allowed compensation outside of the Act because of
the current Utah case law on this issue as outlined in Hinds
v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978).
appellant's Brief at pp. 17-18.

See

In Hinds, Hughes was an

independent subcontractor who constructed a building for the
general contractor.

Hughes contracted with Hayes to construct

the masonry walls in the building.

The plaintiff, Hinds, was

an employee of Hayes and was injured in an on-the-job
accident.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Hinds from the
case at bar by referring to Mays as a "downstream" employee.
Appellant contends that because Riddle was injured by a
"downstream" employee, he should be allowed to maintain a civil
action.

This argument ignores the whole concept of fairness as

outlined in Smith v. Alfred Brown Company, 493 P.2d 994 (Utah
1972).

In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
It would be quite inconsistent with our
ideas of even-handed justice to apply a
liberal interpretation of the Act in order
to assure coverage to employees, but if it
appears that there is other coverage, to
then reverse the policy and apply a
restricted view to exclude coverage in
order to allow an employee to sue an
employer. We think the ends of justice
-9-

will best be served and the beneficial
purposes of the Act will be best
accomplished for employees and employers
alike, if the statute is applied in an
uniform manner, whomever1s rights may be
at stake.
:Ed.at 995.

Thus, what appellant requests the Court to do in

this instance is allow them to pursue a civil suit against Mays
when appellant in fact admits that if Mays had been injured by
the negligence of appellant, no such suit would be allowed
under current Utah law.
Appellant also contends that dicta in Shupe v.
Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976) controls this
appeal.

While Shupe was decided after the 1975 amendment

to Section 62, the case arose prior to this amendment and the
amendments had no bearing on the Shupe decision.

In fact,

the Justice who provided the dicta relied on by appellant in
his brief had a dissenting opinion in Hinds.

The majority in

Hinds rejected the dissenting Justice's interpretation of the
1975 amendments to Section 62 and determining that Section 42
should still be used to define employer for purposes of
determining immunity from civil suit.

Because Hinds has

remained good law in Utah for over ten years, it should not now
be overturned based on a dissenting opinion and dicta from an
earlier case.
The language in the 1975 amendment to Section 62 and
the applicable case law decided since that amendment does not
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support appellant's position that a civil suit can now be
maintained.

The applicable portions of Section 62 now read as

follows:
When any injury or death from which
compensation is payable under this title
shall have been caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of a person other than an
employee, officer, agent, or employee of
said employer, the injured employee, or in
case of death his dependants, may claim
compensation and the injured employee or
his heirs or personal representative may
also have a action for damages against such
third person . . . .
For purposes of this section and not
withstanding the provisions of Section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also
maintain an action for damages against
subcontractors, general contractors,
independent contractors, property owners or
their lessees or assigns, not occupying an
employee-employer relationship with the
injured or deceased employee at the time of
his injury or death.
This amendment did away with the language, "not in
the same employment," and replaced it with the language,
"person other than an employer."

The Court in Hinds

considered this amendment and stated that the amendment:
enables an employee to sue a tort-feasor
not his employer (or the employer's agent,
etc.), [i.e. 'employer' as defined in
Section 42 which includes 'statutory
employer'] even though the injured person
and the tort-feasor may be engaged in the
same employment.
Id. at p. 562. The Supreme Court in Hinds recognized that
the employer-employee definitions as outlined in Section 42
-11-

should still be used to determine whether an employer-employee
relationship existed.

This amendment did away with overbroad

language that had precluded civil suits in the past and
replaced that language with the more narrow definitions found
in Section 42. Finally, the 1975 amendment does not have the
effect of insulating everyone at the work place from civil
liability as appellant contends.

With this amendment and its

subsequent interpretation in Hinds outlined above, only
employers and employees meeting the requirements of Section 42
receive immunity from civil liability.
Appellant contends that the language,
"notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42," in the
1975 amendment to Section 62 removes the application of the
concept of statutory employer from this section.

However, this

contention presents difficulties in reconciling such language
with the remaining language of Section 62. Section 62 goes on
to state that only those who are not occupying an
"employee-employer relationship may maintain a civil action."
Thus, the definitions in Section 42 must be applied to
determine an employer-employee relationship.

The intent of the

1975 amendment to Section 62 was not to abrogate civil immunity
on behalf of "statutory employers," but to confine that
immunity to only those employers as defined in Section 42.
Again, respondents' position is supported by the Hinds
decision discussed earlier, which interpreted the 1975
-12-

amendment to Section 62. Also, accepting appellant's position
on this amendment would require MSI to pay workers'
compensation premiums for the employees of every subcontractor
working side-by-side with MSI on a given work site in order
for MSI to protect itself from civil liability for any injury
to employees of other subcontractors caused by MSI employees.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed, that the Utah
Workmen's Compensation Act is designed both to provide swift
and certain compensation to employees and for:

the correlated important purpose of
assuring employers that if they provide
this protection for their employees, the
employers will themselves be protected
against the possibility of exorbitant
claims for injuries.
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d at 995.

It makes no

sense to afford limited liability to entities qualifying as
statutory employers under the Workmen's Compensation Act, while
denying such limited liability to subcontractors and others
working on a site with an injured employee who have much less
control over, and even less contact with, the injured employee
than the protected statutory employer has.

POINT III
THE "LOANED SERVANT DOCTRINE" PRECLUDES
RIDDLE FROM SUING EITHER MSI OR MAYS.
The "loaned servant doctrine" applies to a situation
-13-

in which one employee of an employer works so closely with the
employees of another employer to effectuate the second
employer's purpose that the employee is said to be "loaned" to
the second employer.

The effect of this doctrine precludes the

loaned employee from suing the second employer.
The case of Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286
(Utah 1976) illustrates this loaned servant doctrine.

In

Bethers, the plaintiff employee was employed by D & L
Corporation, the first employer, as a truck driver.

Bethers,

the second employer, contracted with D & L Corporation to load
wood from Bethers' truck to a D & L Truck, and to haul the
load to Colorado.

Plaintiff was assigned to load the wood and

haul it and plaintiff was told to work according to the
procedures of the second employer.

In the process of operating

a forklift to load the wood onto the second truck, plaintiff
was badly injured.

The Court held that Bambrough, the

plaintiff, was a "loaned servant" and therefore the second
employer's liability to Bambrough was limited to benefits
under the Act.
Bambrough argued that the loaned servant doctrine
should not apply because (1) there had been no written contract
between the two employers, (2) Bambrough had not consented to
be loaned to the second employer, and (3) the first employer
had not surrendered control over his employee to the second
employer.

Bambrough at 1291-92. The Court ruled that:
-14-

The Utah Workman's Compensation Act does
not expressly require consent on the
employee's part to establish the requisite
relationship, nor is a written contract a
required formality for workmen's
compensation purposes under the laws of
Utah.
Bambrough at 1291.

In addition, the Court stated: "it has

never been held by this Court that for the loaned servant
doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely
surrender all control over his loaned employee."

Bambrough

at 1292. The Court focused on the effect of the working
arrangement and discounted the significance of individual
elements.
Applying the effect of the working arrangement
between the parties in the instant case, Riddle was a "loaned
servant" and employed by Owens-Corning to work with MSI
employees on the construction of a storage warehouse.

Because

of this close working relationship with MSI and Mays,
Riddle's ability to recover against respondents should be
limited to benefits under the Act.

POINT IV
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS REGARDING
THE ISSUE OF OWENS-CORNING'S CONTROL OVER MSI.
Appellants argue that a genuine issue of fact exists
as to Owens-Coming's control over MSI. However, it should
be pointed out that at the trial court level, respondents

-15-

presented evidence from Riddle's deposition to show that Riddle
had supervision and control over respondents.

Riddle

specifically stated in his deposition that he supervised and
controlled what was done on the job site by MSI.

Thus, the

issue of control having been answered by appellant himself, the
trial court correctly determined that no genuine issue of
material fact existed with regard to this issue.

CONCLUSION
The Utah case law, as it has interpreted the 1975
amendment to Section 62, specifically precludes those in a
statutory employer-employee relationship from bringing civil
actions against one another.

While appellant admits that Mays

could not bring a civil action against Riddle had he been the
injured party in this case, appellant asks the Court to allow
him to bring a civil action against Mays despite the statutory
employer-employee relationship.

The concept of fairness, as

espoused in previous Utah Supreme Court cases, requires that
this exclusive remedy of the Workers1 Compensation Act be
applied uniformly no matter which party's rights are at stake.
Thus, because Riddle and Mays are essentially co-employees as
defined under Section 42 and the applicable case law, Riddle is
precluded under Section 60 from bringing a civil action.

In

addition, Riddle's only claim against MSI is through Mays and
given the fact that no claim outside the Workers' Compensation
-16-

Act exists against Mays, no such claim would exist against
MSI.
Appellant's contention that applying the 1975
amendment to Section 62 in the manner espoused by respondents
and as applied by the Utah Supreme Court would give every
individual on the job site immunity from civil suit is wholly
without merit.

Obviously, the provisions of Section 42

governing the statutory employer-employee relationship would
still need to be met regarding supervision and control and part
or process in the same trade or business to obtain immunity
from civil suit.
Finally, by appellant's own admission, he supervised
the work being done by respondents and because appellant was
employed directly by Owens-Corning, Owens-Corning's control
over respondents is imputed through the actions of appellant.
For these reasons, respondents respectfully request that this
Court affirm the lower court's decision to grant summary
j udgment.
DATED this

1988.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

NELSON ^ T HAYES ^
SUSAN P. DYER
LLOYD A. HARDCASTLE
Attorneys for Alan Mays and
Mountain States Insulation Corp.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed on this J^V^day of
'&£~£*PUi&4Z/^
J&

, 1988 to the following counsel of record:

GORDON K. JENSEN
ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM "A"
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ADDENDUM "A"

;5.]-f2. Employers enumerated and defined Regularly employed - Independent contractors.
7nc following consiiiuic employers subject to the
provisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and
school district in the state.
(2)(a) Every person, firm, and corporation, including every public utility, having in service one or
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in
;nc same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or
.mpiiwd, oral or written, except:
(i) agricultural employers: (A) whose employees arc all members of the immediate family of the
employer, which employer has a proprietary interest
:n the farm, the inclusion of any immediate family
member under the provisions of this title being at
the option of the employer; or (B) who employ five
or fewer persons other than immediate family
members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any pan of the
preceding 12 months; and •
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ
one employee or more than one employee at least 40
hours per week.
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and
domestic servants have the right to come under the
terms of this title by complying with the provisions
of this title and the rules of the commission.

(3) As used in this section:
- (a) 'Regularly" includes all employments in the
usual course of the trade, business, profession, or
occupation of the employer, whether continuous
throughout the year or for only a ponion of the
year.
__
(b) Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in pan for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and this work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons
employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and
all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, arc considered employees of the original employer. . •
• ;.
• .
• (c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in
the performance of work as an independent contractor is considered an employer.
•.••.•.'•
(d) . 'Independent contractor' .means any
person, association, or corporation engaged in the
performance of any work for another who, while so
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that
pcnains to the execution of the work, is not subject
to the rule or. control of the employer, is engaged
only in the performance of a definite job or piece of
work, and is subordinate to the employer only in
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design.
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35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917,
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1.
Cross-References. — Employment of children, § 34-23-1 et seq.

Utah Occuoational Disease Disability Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq.
Meaning of "this act". — See the note under the same catchline following § 35-1-46.

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of" recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72: C.L. 1917,
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-5S; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;

L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1: 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973,
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3.
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1
2

Q

Mark Riddle, Portageville# Missouri.

Is he still in

Portageville?

3

A

He's in Wardell.

4

Q

And Linda Joyce Riddle May, Portageville.

5

Is she

still in Portageville?

6

A

She's in Essex.

7

Q

And one or both of those would know how to get a

8

hold of your first wife; is that right?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Let me go back with you again.

So Owens Corning

11

informed you that they needed some construction workers to

12

build a shed; is that what you said?

13
14

A

I was sent here to mobilize the job.

start date from T. C. Construction.

15
16

Yes.

Q

people would be needed to build this outbuilding of some kind?
A

Warehouse storage.

18

Q

And what was your job then?

classification?

20
21
22
23
24
25

We had a subcontract.

And when you arrived, you were told that additional

17

19

We had a

A

What was your job

What were you called?

My job classification with Owens Corning Fiberglass

is carpenter, general foreman.
Q

Was that your classification when you came here to

Utah?
A

I came here —

you want to.

you can take this off the record if

Those hoppers in the bag house, we had to set

16
one of them up.

I'd scaffolded it out completely, and thin

they sent a sheet metal man off of another job out of Nevada
over here and took the measurements off of it.

See, we

prefabed every piece of that power house that we installed at
our factory.

And I was sent here to specifically get that one

scaffold up, the only one, and build a warehouse for storage.
Q

You were kind of the supervisor of the whole thing

on site?
A

I was the supervisor.

Q

Was there anyone else when you were sent here that

were Owens Corning employees?
A

No.

Q

Were you supervising anyone is what I'm asking?

Were you supervising the work of anybody else?
A

No.

Q

And to build this warehouse
MR. JENSEN:

—

Nelson, let me ask, when you say was he

supervising the work of anyone else, what do you mean?
MR. HAYES:

When he arrived here.

When he came, was

he brought here with other people to supervise anybody.
THE WITNESS:
Q

There was no other people except me.

(BY MR. HAYES)

And some time subsequent to that,

you hired Alan Mays and apparently some other people to build
a warehouse for Owens Corning, I assume?
A

Alan Mays did not come on the job until after the
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warehouse was built.
Q

So he wasn't brought in to construct the warehouse?

A

No.

Q

What was he hired to do, then?

A

He was hired by Mountain States Insulation Company

as a laborer.
Q

Let me back up with you, I guess I misunderstood

what you told me.

I understood that you told me that you

hired him to come out from Kansas to work as a laborer,
construction person in the building of a warehouse for Owens
Corning.
A

I did.

Q

Why did you tell me that?

A

Because I didn't know what the company had planned.

They told me to get people on the job, get the scaffold up fo
measurement.
Q

Okay.

A

I done exactly that.

He was employed by Owens

Corning Fiberglass approximately three weeks.
Q

So he did come out from Kansas at your request and

was employed with Owens Corning Fiberglass to put up this one
scaffold for three weeks?
A

I didn't say the one scaffold, he worked

approximately three weeks.
Q

Putting up the scaffold?

18

1

A

Moving scaffolding,

2

Q

When was that?

3

A

I don't know.

4

Q

In relationship to January of 1985, when was it?

5

A

January of 19 85?

6

Q

I mean, when was he putting up scaffolding in

7
8
9
10
11

The dates I'm not sure of.

In relationship to what?

relation to January of 19 85?
A

In January of 19 85, he didn't work for me, he worked

for Mountain States Insulation.
Q

That's what I'm asking.

Was it one month before,

two months before?

12

A

Four or five months.

13

Q

And at the end of the three weeks that he worked

14

under you when you were the foreman, what was his reason for

15

terminating?

16
17

A

The company terminated all O.C. employees, except me

and Steve Gabb.

18

Q

Why?

19

A

They hired Mountain States Insulation Company to

20
21
22

supply labor.
Q

Had you worked with Mountain States Insulation prior

to that time?

23

A

I've never worked for them.

24

Q

I didn't say for them, I said with them.

25

A

Never.
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Q

Had they been on the job before then?

A

No.

Q

So when they hired Mountain States Insulation, Alan

Mays went over and worked for them?
A

They put him on their payroll.

Q

Was he doing the same thing he'd been doing working

for you?
A

Yes, basically.

Q

Were you supervising him?

A

No.

Q

You weren't supervising him?

A

No.

Q

You weren't responsible for what he was doing?

A

I was in a sense.

My property manager would tell me

what work was to be done on what particular part of the power
house.

I had only to go to the foreman of a carpenter, the

foreman of a laborer and the work was disbursed from there.
Q

Who would you go to that you were aware of that

would supervise or instruct Mr. Mays?
A

Maynard Crossland was the labor superintendent.

Q

Crossland?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And he was an employee of Mountain States?

A

He's a brother of Mountain States Insulation

Company.
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Q

What?

A

He owns 30 percent of the Mountain States Insulation

Company, to my understanding.

His brother owns Mountain

States Insulation Company.
Q

Well, my question is Maynard Crossland was the

supervisor with Mountain States?
A

Yes.

Q

And you would tell him what had to be done?

A

We would confer, have meetings daily.

Q

Would you oversee what was being done by Maynard

Crossland and his people?
A

Exactly.

That's what I was there for.

Q

You were there to tell them, for instance, how to do

the work?
A

I was to

—

MR. JENSEN:
what he was doing.

I'll just object to you telling him

I don't have a problem with you asking him

what his responsibility was.
MR. HAYES:

Well, I think he's an adverse witness.

I think I can probably ask him any way I need to.
THE WITNESS:
Q

Bring that question back.

(BY MR. HAYES)

Was it your responsibility to tell

them how to do the work?
A

If it was wrong, I'd raise the question.

I worked

through Owens Corning for safety, OSHA regulations on erecting

21
scaffolding.
Q

But what I'm interested in is were they erecting

scaffolding?
A

He was a laborer.

Q

Was Alan Mays erecting scaffolding?

A

No.

Q

What was he doing?

A

He was a step and fetch man.

He was getting

scaffolding for carpenters.
Q

And were you on the job when he was performing his

activities?
A

Yes.

Q

You were there and you would oversee and see what

was happening?
A

Exactly.

Q

As Mountain States would perform their work?

A

Right.

Q

And if it wasn't being done properly, you had

authority to require that it be done properly?
A

Exactly.

Q

And you had authority to, as a result of your

involvement with Owens Corning and your knowledge of OSHA
regulations and so on and so forth, you had authority to make
sure that it was done safely?
A

Yes.
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Q

And you could tell Mr. Crossland or the people that

worked under him how to do the work if it wasn't being done
safely?
A

Yes.

Q

And if it was being done improperly, you could

require that they do it properly?
A

Yes.

Q

When you were performing that function, did you have

anyone working under you?
A

No.

Q

And the only other person that was an Owens Corning

employee was this Steve Gabb?
A

Yes.

Q

What was he doing?

A

He was a sheet metal superintendent.

Q

You were the construction superintendent?

A

Nope.

I was carpenter general foreman.

I seen to

and took care of the scaffolding.
Q

So Steve Gabb was performing a different function?

A

Installation of materials.

Q

Was he doing the same thing, as far as supervising

or overseeing the work of Mountain States Insulation?
A

Exactly.

Q

Who did you report to?

A

Stacy Eskelin.

